Commentary for Bava Kamma 45:11

תפשוט דפי פרה

But if the one who holds that fire implies human agency also maintains that Fire is chattel,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So that whenever the human agency is at an end, there would still be a possibility of liability being incurred. ');">⁷</span> what then is the practical point at issue?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., what is the difference in law whether the liability for Fire is for the principles of human agency and chattel combined, or only on account of the principle of chattel? The difference could of course be only in the case where the human agency involved in Fire was not yet brought to an end. For otherwise the liability according to both views would only be possible on account of the principle of chattel, a principle which is according to the latest conclusion maintained by all. ');">¹⁰</span> — The point at issue is whether Fire<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' In cases where the human agency was not yet at an end. ');">¹¹</span> will involve the [additional] Four Items.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., Pain, Healing, Loss of Time and Degradation, which in the case of Man, but not Ox, injuring men are paid in addition to Depreciation which is a liability common in all cases; v. supra p. 12. According to R. Johanan who considers Fire a human agency, the liability will be not only for Depreciation but also for the additional Four Items: whereas Resh Lakish maintains that only Depreciation will be paid, as in the case of damage done by Cattle. ');">¹²</span> [THE OWNER OF THE DOG] PAYS FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE CAKE WHEREAS FOR THE BARN [HE] PAYS [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES. Who is liable [for the barn]? — The owner of the dog. But why should not the owner of the coal also be made liable?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since it was his coal that did the damage. ');">¹³</span> — His [burning] coal was [well] guarded by him.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' He is therefore not to blame. ');">¹⁴</span> If the [burning] coal was well guarded by him, how then did the dog come to it? — By breaking in. R. Mari the son of R. Kahana thereupon said: This ruling implies that the average door is not beyond being broken in by a dog.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For if otherwise the breaking in should be an act of unusual occurrence that should be subject to the law applicable to Horn, involving only the compensation of half damages for the consumption of the cake. ');">¹⁵</span> Now in whose premises was the cake devoured? It could hardly be suggested that it was devoured in the barn of another party,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., a barn not belonging to the owner of the cake. ');">¹⁶</span> for do we not require <i>And shall feed in the field of another</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Ex. XXII, 4. ');">¹⁷</span> [the plaintiff], which is not the case here? — No, it applies where it was devoured in the barn of the owner of the cake. You can thus conclude that [the plaintiff's food carried in] the mouth of [the defendant's] cattle

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